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Water reallocation is one of the morecontentious issues in the West today.Even though many people resist change,
reallocation is a reality that must be faced.  Increased
urban water demands and environmental
requirements have created a need to re-examine
the ways we currently use water.  To accommodate
this need, Western water law has been in transition
(Wilkinson 1985). However, the transition has not
always been smooth, and reallocation has not always
been the focus of reform.  As a result, finding an
equitable and efficient means for reallocation has
become a critical issue. If they can be improved,
water markets may offer a solution.
Much of the current water use in the West has
been static for the past century.  With over 80 percent
of all water being used for agricultural purposes,
irrigation dominates.  Nevertheless, reallocation will
substantially change the location and manner of
water use, thus altering the West’s water use map.
In addition, the simplification of the reallocation
process via improvements in water market will likely
facilitate similar changes.  Clearly, the geographic
consequences of reallocation will be substantial.
A few years ago a project was funded to examine
reallocating water in response to global climate
change.  Water markets were the study’s focus.
The project’s premise was that water markets could
be improved if better scientific models were made
available.  Currently, water markets are constrained
by uncertain user and environmental impacts
resulting from market transactions that require
changing the place and nature of water use.
According to the premise, better scientific models
(i.e. those based on geographic information systems)
would provide a more accurate quantification of the
impacts and therefore reduce this uncertainty
(Matthews et al. 2001).  This premise still has merit,
but another perhaps better way to reduce market
constraints exists.  In short, the property rights that
define the limits of water use need to be simplified
so that better scientific models will not be needed.
Accordingly, this article initially examines the nature
of water rights, the need for water markets, and the
nature of the market constraints. It then makes
recommendations on how those constraints can be
removed and examines the feasibility of doing so.
The Nature of Private
Water Rights in the West
As the Western United States began to develop,
the water rights doctrine existing in the East proved
inadequate because sufficient water for all potential
uses was often absent.   To allocate water during
times of shortage, the appropriation doctrine was
formulated.  It created a preference right to use
water based on temporal priority— first in time, first
in right.  This preference, which gives the first water
user the highest possible “security of delivery” in
times of shortage, is the cornerstone of the
appropriation doctrine.  The justification for the
appropriation doctrine’s temporal priorities is
investment protection (Matthews 1984).  After all,
who would invest in an expensive diversion and
delivery infrastructure unless the delivery of water
was secure?  Temporal priority prevents subsequent
water users from interfering with established rights,
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thereby protecting the investment.  The central
element of the property right is the priority date that
establishes the preference.
Because water is a mobile resource, a water right
cannot be an “exclusive” right as is the case with
other property, such as land (Matthews 1991).
Rather, water rights are usufructary (or use) rights.
Applying the term “ownership” to these rights is a
misconception because that term carries the
connotation of exclusivity.   Although Western states
claim ownership of the water within their boundaries
either in their own name or in trust for the people of
the state, the Supreme Court of the United States
has called their claims a legal fiction (Sporhase v.
Nebraska 1982).  If state ownership is a “legal
fiction,” then states cannot give title to private
individuals. A state cannot give away what it does
not have. Therefore, water should not be thought of
as an owned resource with exclusive use rights.
Instead, it should be seen as a shared resource with
multiple use rights (i.e. both public and private)
existing in it at the same time.   Even though these
usufructary rights are shared and non-exclusive,
Western states protect them from unconstitutional
“takings” (Sax 1990).  Thus, like private property
rights, these rights have some degree of constitutional
protection.
The private use rights established under state law
traditionally require that water be “diverted” from
its source and applied to a “beneficial use.”  Today,
a permit is generally mandatory.  The right created
under state law is limited.   The location, time, volume,
manner, and diversion point of the original use are
fixed and any change in them requires a consideration
of harm to other users and the “public interest.”  This
“no injury” rule limits the ability of water right holders
to change uses or sell the right (Gould 1988).  In
addition, water uses are required to be “beneficial.”
However, it is not always clear what constitutes a
beneficial use.  Even if “waste” itself is
unacceptable, traditional uses that are inefficient from
a conservation perspective may be viewed as
beneficial  (Tarlock 1987).  A period of non-use may
also lead to an abandonment or forfeiture of the right.
These various rules define the private rights to
use water.  Transfers through markets and other
methods must take place according to these rules.
The market constraints created by these property
rules are substantial.  Before these constraints are
addressed, the need for markets will be considered.
Why Markets?
I began my career with an aversion to water
markets, but I have come to realize that markets
themselves are not the problem. I merely oppose
the way water markets operate within the traditional
property rights structure of the West.  Appropriately
designed property rights structures can overcome
some of the negative aspects historically associated
with water markets.  However, a question still
remains: “Why consider markets at all?”
A growing body of literature from scientists, policy
makers, and the press stresses the need for some
form of reallocation (Kaiser and McFarland 1997).
Reallocation is advocated because water is not being
used where it is needed.  Cites, farmers, and
recreationists want more, and endangered species
need more.  However, there is little “more” water in
the West.  Without the ability to create “more” water
through new water projects, the remaining choices
are conservation and reallocation.  Although
conservation is an excellent method of making more
water available, it has its own constraints within the
property rights structure (though those are beyond
the scope of this short article).
The other option, reallocation, can be
accomplished through two basic methods: markets
and regulation.  Markets have been suggested as a
means of moving water to uses with higher economic
returns (Kaiser 1996).  For example, if constraints
on markets are removed, water would move from
agricultural uses to urban uses.  Markets have also
been suggested as a way of reducing waste by
improving efficiency (i.e from a conservation
perspective).  Because market transactions involve
willing buyers and sellers, markets also act equitably.
Although these brief statements are
oversimplifications, they are sufficient to illustrate
some of the perceived advantages of markets.  The
major disadvantages under the traditional Western
system are: 1) the uncertain impact transfers will
have on third parties and 2) the failure to realistically
consider the interests of the public (e.g the
maintenance of in-stream flows and protection of
the environment).
The alternative to markets is regulation.
Reallocation through regulation can protect the
public’s interest in water. That, indeed, is the purpose
of many regulations. Regulations can also push
water use to higher value uses and toward better
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efficiency.  However, regulations are not always
perceived as equitable.  In many western states,
water regulations are perceived as an inherent evil
that somehow must be unconstitutional. Regulating
water in any way is contrary to “God, Country and
the American Way.”  With this attitude toward
regulations, the viability of markets as a means of
achieving revised water policy goals, needs to be
considered.
Constraints on Water Markets
As suggested above, the main constraint on water
markets is the inability to accurately and easily
quantify the effects on others of changes in water
use.  Because water rights are not exclusive, third
party effects need to be considered in any proposed
transaction.  The appropriation doctrine defines the
property right, but it also requires that “no injury” be
done to other private right holders as a result of a
transaction.  In addition, statutes require a
consideration of the public interest before the state
agency approves any transaction.  In the past, a
consideration of the public interest was perfunctory
with any traditional beneficial use being in the public
interest.  Today, environmental concerns and other
public interest uses are being considered (Grant
1987).  The requirement to look at third part effects
puts enormous constraints on water markets.
The traditional way to alleviate third party effects
is to allow the sale of the consumptive use only.
The consumptive amount is the volume of water
removed from the system by the water user making
it unavailable to other users or the environment.  This
volume is not quantified as part of the right. In
general, the volumetric measure of the right is taken
at the point of diversion where it can be easily
measured.  This diversionary right is not the same
as the consumptive amount. Determining the
consumptive amount requires a case-by-case
determination. This means each potential transaction
is unique.
Other constraints are built into the system.  Even
when a user has a permit, the use entitlements
accruing in him or her are often uncertain .  Many
rights have yet to be adjudicated, meaning they do
not have the force of law behind them.  In addition,
a permit does not insure the right has not been lost
through abandonment.  A period of non-use will result
in the loss of a right regardless of permit possession.
No system currently exists to monitor abandonment,
so a case-by-case determination must be made
before water is sold.  Private rights may also lack
clarity because “new” public rights, which have an
impact on private rights, are asserted .  For example,
minimum flow requirements to protect endangered
species may interfere with private rights.  Because
the public interests are not always clear or known,
the security of the title to private rights can be placed
in doubt.
The last constraint to be considered is one that
limits transfers spatially.  This limit can result from
two circumstances.  An interstate compact may, on
its surface, prevent the export of water.  However,
sound arguments can be made that only a few
compacts permanently allocate water in ways that
prevent marketing across state boundaries
(Matthews and Pease 2002).  Some irrigation
districts also have restrictions on sales outside the
district’s boundaries.  Although the original reasons
for these restrictions were sound policy, they
artificially constrain markets in ways that are
unnecessary today.  Those irrigation districts formed
under the Reclamation Act may be able to limit
exports, but those without a federal umbrella are
probably unconstitutional.
Suggestions for Changing the
Property Rights Structure
The first step toward removing the constraints
on water markets is to eliminate the need for case-
by-case determinations of consumptive amounts.
Treating each right as something unique adds to the
transaction costs of water transfers.  To resolve this
problem, the use entitlement of each right holder
needs to be standardized.  Some states have acheived
a degree of standardization by setting a maximum
volume allowable per acre.  This volume is not the
consumptive amount, however, which is the volume
necessary to account for third party effects.  To get
around this problem, the water entitlement needs
two volumes associated with it, a diversionary
amount and a discount rate.  From a practical point
of view, the diversionary entitlement should be
measured from the point of diversion.  To account
for third party effects, a standardized discount rate
should also be established.  This would replace the
case-by-case determination of consumptive amount.
The discount should be substantial enough to return
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some portion of the water to the public sector any
time there is a sale of water.  This would be like a
tax on the transaction.  The water right holder would
have a diversionary right to a specific volume and
title to a discounted volume that would be subject to
sale.  An example will help clarify what is meant.  A
farmer irrigates 100 acres of land and has a right to
divert 250 acre-feet of water (2.5 acre-feet per acre).
The discount rate includes a standardized estimate
of consumptive amount (1.25 acre-feet per acre for
example) and a tax aimed at returning some water
to the public sector (.25 acre-feet for example).  The
amount available for sale in this example would be
100 acre-feet (2.5 diversionary amount minus 1.25
consumption amount minus .25 tax = 1.0 acre-feet
x 100 acres = 100 acre feet).  Standardizing the
diversionary entitlements and creating a standard
discount rate, removes the uniqueness of each
transaction.  As with zoning, some people might have
a more valuable right after standardization and others
might have a less valuable right.  The advantage is
the right holder would know exactly what their right
was and would know exactly what could be sold.
The second major change is to clarify what is
considered a valid private right.  Problems with
unadjudicated rights, abandonment, and conflicts with
newly asserted public rights could be removed by
creating a title register.  The title register would be a
guarantee to the buyer and seller that a valid title
would pass after a sale.  A similar system has been
developed for land transactions and is called a
Torrens system. Use of such a system has been
suggested in South Australia (Young and McColl
2002).  The register would include a record of the
diversionary amount, the discount rate, the season
in which the right could be exercised, and the priority
date.  The concept of abandonment would be
eliminated, meaning non-use would not affect the
title.  Although this could lead to some speculation,
speculation is not an inherent evil as was assumed
in the appropriation doctrine.  The concept of
abandonment and its “use it or lose it” philosophy
leads to many wasteful practices. If a water right is
on the register, it would be available for sale with
the title guaranteed.
The last major constraint, spatial limitations on
marketing water, is not really part of the property
rights system, but it needs to be eliminated as well.
This point has been discussed elsewhere, so
additional space will not be devoted to it here
(Matthews and Pease 2002).
Issues Remaining
Two issues remain to be addressed.  Is this an
unconstitutional taking of property?  Is it politically
feasible?  Any time the use of property is changed
or restricted, the question arises as to whether a
constitutionally protected property right has been
taken requiring compensation.  What is proposed
here is a regulation of property not unlike the
regulation of land under zoning ordinances.  As with
land, some reduction in property values attributable
to regulation is acceptable.  However, the exact line
where regulation becomes a taking is not clear.  With
the revisions proposed, property values arguably
would not decrease at all.  Instead, there should be
an increase in value as a result of the reduction in
transaction costs and an increase in the marketability
attributable to title guarantees.  Good arguments can
be made for the constitutional validity of the
proposed changes.
Politically, such policy changes may also be
possible.  Water rights holders would have to be
convinced they would be better off under this new
system.  If their rights are more valuable as a result
of the changes, as suggested above, then opposition
should disappear.  A grass roots effort would be
required to convince farmers and other water rights
holders that they would not be harmed by such
changes.  Such an undertaking would be difficult
but not impossible.  One convincing argument is that
markets may be more equitable to the rights holder
than regulations restricting use.  Whatever the policy
choice, some form of reallocation is needed.
Markets may be the most equitable way of achieving
it.
Conclusion
For much of the West, water is the controlling
variable for economic development.  Functioning
water markets have the potential of making
substantial changes in the nature and place of
western water use.  Because agriculture is the
dominant water use, such changes will change the
way agriculture is practiced.  Reallocation will also
allow favorably situated urban areas to expand and
will potentially make possible improvements in the
natural environment.  As water allocation helped
create the current geography of the West, water
reallocation will help change it.
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